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Abstract
This paper introduces a new approach of testing capital structure hypothesis on
a …rm speci…c level. Johansen’s procedure for cointegration testing is employed to
test theories of optimal capital structure. The sample covers a …rm with unique
properties, Hufvudstaden, during the period 1938 until present. The approach of
cointegration allows testing of long-run equilibrium between non-stationary time-
series. We …nd empirical support that capital structure follow a dynamic equilibrium
path. However, this equilibrium is more complex as posited by existing theories.
The result is found for leverage measured as both book-value- and market-value-of-
equity.
11 Introduction
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) paper created modern corporate …nance and modern capi-
tal structure theory. In a world with complete capital markets they showed the irrelevance
of a …rms’ leverage for its value of the …rm. Although appealing, several researchers, has
found the proposition of Miller’s theories inadequate.1
A shortcoming of the existing empirical literature is that it is primarily characterized
by cross-sectional studies. Although, panel-data studies have been conducted they do not
capture the dynamics of the capital structure and their response to the determinants.
Most of the corporate capital structure models are based on the assumption that
individual …rms optimize their capital structure. It is in this context remarkable how
industry speci…c or company speci…c studies have been neglected in the literature.
The contribution of the paper is that we examine the empirical relationship over time,
between capital structure of a single …rm, Hufvudstaden AB, in a speci…c industry and its
determinants as posited by the existing theories. The following corporate …nance theories
are being tested: the Modigliani and Miller hypothesis (1963), the bankruptcy costs-tax
shield hypothesis of Baxter (1967), and …nally the agency cost hypothesis of Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977)).
Hufvudstaden AB has been the dominating real estate company quoted on the Stock-
holm Stock Exchange, SSE, during the years 1938-1996.2 The company has some rather
unique features motivating a case study of its capital structure. First, Hufvudstaden has
remained in the same line of business and still supplies the same product, o¢ce areas in
the heart of Stockholm, as when established in 1926. Second, being a real estate com-
pany it represents a large amount of real capital to serve as collateral for creditors. Third,
Hufvudstaden has always been pro…table and dividend paying and it has not been involved
in any mergers and acquisitions during the investigated period.3
The outline of the paper is as follows. The hypotheses to be tested are speci…ed in
section 2. The methodology and data are described in section 3. The results and the
1See Fischer et al (1989), Dammon and Senbet (1988), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Kim (1978),
and Myers (1977), among others.
2Hufvudstaden AB alone has represented more than 60 percent of the total market value of all real
estate companies quoted on the SSE during 1938-1996. See also Gra‡und (2000a).
3This statement is based upon a complete sample of all annual reports from Hufvudstaden AB 1926-
1996. A reputation of dividends is a costly signal of earnings. According to MacKie-Mason (1990)
dividend paying …rms are able to issue equity without su¤ering the mistrust of investors as proposed by
Myers and Majluf (1984).
2empirical evidence are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Corporate capital structure
The capital structure theory can be divided into four categories. First, trade-o¤ mod-
els such as bankruptcy costs-tax shield hypothesis (Kim (1978)). Second, asymmetric
information models such as agency cost hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers
(1977)). Third, signaling models of asymmetric information developed by Myers (1984)
and Myers and Majluf (1984) and last models that demonstrate the irrelevance of capital
structure (see Stiglitz (1974), Miller (1977) and Fama (1978)).
Most of the existing models in corporate capital structure theory are based on the
…ndings of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Miller (1977) extended the model to incorporate
personal taxes. However, Sarig and Scott (1985) question the existence of tax-induced
…nancial leverage and points out there are no reason for a relationship between tax-
induced clienteles and leverage. They argue that tax-induced dividend clienteles have
been interpreted as tax induced …nancial leverage.
Myers (1977) argues in his asymmetric information model, that agency costs will arise
due to creditor’s inability to constrain the behavior of the corporations’ management.
Equilibrium will be established when the expected marginal cost of debt …nancing equals
the expected marginal bene…t of debt …nancing.
Kim (1978) shows that the existence of substantial costs associated with bankruptcy
discourage debt …nancing. According to the model …rms has a trade o¤ between the
potential costs of bankruptcy and the tax incentive of debt. Thus, …rms’ have an optimal
capital structure and capital structure is important for the individual in these models.
The weakness of the above models is that they all are single period models and, thus,
ignore the …rms’ dynamic behavior of the capital structure. Francis and Leachman (1994)
point out that this weakness extends to most of the studies, which have addressed the
question of optimal capital structure. According to them there is a lack of time series
studies and the cointegration framework is able to capture dynamic behavior of …rms.
Fischer et al (1989) theoretically addresses the question of …rms’ dynamic optimal capital
behavior. They argue that the often-used results of static cross-sectional models are
questionable if …rms follow a dynamic optimal behavior. Further they point out that
…rms do not have an optimal debt/equity mix. Instead they have a range over which
their debt/equity mix is allowed to vary.
We assume that a high corporate tax will increase the debt ratio and we expect that
3the leverage of the …rm will decrease if there are agency costs and bankruptcy costs. Given
discussion in this section the following testable hypotheses emerge.
² H1: There is an equilibrium relationship between agency costs and the corporate
debt ratio.
² H2: There is an equilibrium relationship between bankruptcy costs and the corpo-
rate debt ratio.
² H3: There is an equilibrium relationship between debt related tax shield and the
corporate debt ratio.
² H4: There is an equilibrium relationship between agency costs bankruptcy costs,
debt related tax shield and the corporate debt ratio.
3 Methodology
The idea is to test if there is equilibrium relationship between the level capital structure
and the level of the explanatory variables. This can be done via the cointegration frame-
work of Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992). The idea is to test
hypothesis H1 - H3 in a bivariate model and to test hypothesis H4 with a multivariate
model. Thus our models are that there exist a linear combinations of the levels of the
variables, I(1), such that the linear combination is stationary, I(0). If cointegration exists
we are able to test the both the short run dynamics, ®, and the long run dynamics, ¯.
3.1 Description of the proxy variables
The variables described in the capital structure theories are not observable. Thus, we
have to use proxy variables to measure agency costs, bankruptcy costs and the …rm’s
optimal capital structure. We extract our proxies from the …ndings in Taggart et al
(1985), MacKie-Mason (1990), Francis et al (1994) and Asgharian (1997). All of our data
are annual, covering the company Hufvudstaden AB during the period 1938-1996.
It is not the intention of this paper to investigate whether or not capital structure
ought to be measured by its book or market vet alue of equity. However, in recognition
of this problem we utilize four measurements of capital structure in the analysis. Thus,
the dependent variable, the capital structure or leverage is measured as ratios of debt-
to-book-value-of-equity (DER), long-term-debt-to-book-value-of-equity (LDER), debt-to-
4market-value-of-equity (DMER)and long-term-debt-to-market-value-of-equity (LDMER).4
The use of long-term-debt-to-equity follows from Miller (1963) and debt-to-equity from
Taggart et al (1985).
Tobin’s Q (TQ) will be used as a rough measure of agency costs because it captures
the changing relationship between future investment opportunities and existing assets
(Taggart et al (1985)). We expect the agency costs to be inversely related to debt-equity
ratio.
Taggart et al (1985) and Francis et al (1994) suggest the use of corporate-tax rate as
a proxy of debt related tax shield, but this approach have been questioned by MacKie-
Mason (1990).5 Following MacKie-Mason (1990) investment tax credits will be used as a
proxy for debt-related tax shield, with the di¤erence here the tax shield (TS) is de…ned
as the ratio of tax investment credits over total assets. High tax shields is expected to
increase the probability of tax reduction, and the …rm faces a lower expected marginal
tax rate, thus the company is less likely to use debt.6
Finally, the rate of three-month t-bills (BILL) and the long-term bonds (BOND) will
be utilized as proxy of the costs associated with debt and more generally, agency cost.7
The return from t-bills and long-term bonds are from Frennberg and Hansson (1998)
database. As the cost of debt increases the …rm is expected to decrease leverage. A
substantial gain using both BILL and BOND together is that it captures the expected
in‡ation as well as …nancial risk premium.8
It is time to point out that the above, hypothesized e¤ects are intuitively the most
likely outcomes. These variables might as well have the opposite e¤ect as indicated above
making it di¢cult to separate the di¤erent e¤ects of the variables (Taggart et al (1985)).
4Many other studies employ the market value of debt. This is not applicable in this case as the
corporate bond market in Sweden has been more or less non-existent. The …nancing of Swedish companies
is mainly carried out via mortgages and by issuing equity.
5We quote MacKie-Mason (1990): ”The statuary corporate tax rate has been nearly constant over
many decades so there is insu¢cient time-series variation for testing”. The actual corporate tax rate paid
by Swedish corporations has, after tax reductions and investment credits, seldom exceeded 30 percent.
Corporate tax rate refers to stipulated tax rate, in my case according to Swedish tax law: SOU 1928:370
§10:a Moment 2.
6This assumes the …rm is pro…table otherwise corporate tax does not matter. Hufvudstaden AB has
been pro…table during the investigated period 1938-1996.
7There are however studies that argue that the spread between corporate bonds of di¤erent rating is
a more suitable proxy (Choe et al. (1992)).
8These variables are assumed to be exogenous for the individual company. The …nancial behavior of
a single …rm is not likely to a¤ect the interest rates in the economy.
5Table 1: Inference between Augmented Dickey-Fuller, ADF, and KPSS tests of unit roots.
ADF H0: Non stationary, unit root
Rejection No rejection
KPSS Rejection Inconclusive Conclusion: Unit root
H0: Stationary No rejection Conclusion: Stationary Inconclusive
The strength ofthe cointegration framework of Johansen (1988)and Johansen and Juselius
(1990, 1992) is that we can identify the e¤ects of individual explanatory variables.
4 Results
4.1 Unit roots
A necessary condition for cointegration tests is the presence of unit roots in the time-series
of interest. The unit root tests have been reported to su¤er from low power therefore we
utilize both the KPSS-test (Kwiatoski, Philips, Schmidt and Shinh (1992))9 aand standard
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics, without trend, to test the order of integration.
The KPSS-test di¤ers from ADF in that it has the null hypothesis of stationary and allows
for error autocorrelation.10 If the null hypothesis of the ADF test is not (is) rejected but
the null hypothesis of the KPSS- test is (not) rejected, then variable is considered non-
stationary (stationary). The sample size of 59 observations is not a problem according to
Shiller and Perron (1985). They point out that the power of unit root test is based on
the time length of the sample rather than the number of observations. The inference of
the KPSS together with the ADF-test is showed in table 1.
The results of the KPSS and the ADF tests are reported in table 2. Since the unit
root tests are pre-tests a 10% con…dence level is employed, but we also choose to report
the signi…cance at 5% con…dence level in table 2.11
KPSS-test rejects the null hypothesis at 5% level for all variables with the exception of
DER. The variable DER cannot be considered to be stationary as it is cannot be rejected
9A number of four lags have been used in the Bartlet window of the KPSS test.
10The test of ADF follows from case 2 in Hamilton (1994) under the assumption that the data generating
process includes a constant. The ADF was initiated with a model containing one lag. The Ljung-Box
Q-statistics indicates that the residuals being white noise at 4, 8 and 12 lags.
11Maddala (1998) questions the power of the unit root tests. He suggests the use of 10-20% con…dence
level in the case of unit root tests.
6Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller, ADF, and KPSS-tests of unit roots.
Variable
TQ DER LDER DMER LDMER TS RF BYM
ADF -1.48 -2.82b -2.51 -2.59 -2.33 -2.94a -1.73 -0.88
KPSS 0.82a 0.23 0.69a 0.97a 1.11a 0.48a 1.09a 1.14a
Comment: a denotes signi…cance at 5% level and b signi…cance at 10% level.
by the ADF-test and it is rejected by the KPSS-test. Thus, the book-value-of-debt-to-
equity-ratio (DER) will not be employed further in the analysis. Special attention is
needed regarding the rejection of the tax-shield ratio. The variable is zero during the
period 1938-1966 and 1990-1996. However, the variable is rejected by both the ADF -test
and the KPSS test at 5% level. The result of the tests for TS is ambiguous leaving us
with no clear answer how to proceed. Being aware of the problem the variable TS will be
used in the models.
4.2 Bivariate results
The lag lengths of the VAR’s in the bivariate and multivariate models have been deter-
mined by both minimizing Aikaike’s information criteria and by ensuring there are no
autocorrelation present in the residual vector.12 The residuals of the cointegration rela-
tionship are not normal distributed. However, the ”¸ statistics”of the Johansen procedure
is reported to be robust to the violation of normality (See Kim and Maddala (1998)).
table 3 presents the results of the bivariate cointegration models. Bivariate cointe-
gration relationship cannot be found between tax shield, TS, and market-value capital
structure proxy LDMER. The ”¸ max-” and the ”¸ trace- statistics” of DMER with TS
present an ambiguous result and cointegration cannot be concluded. The results of the
short and the long interest rates, BILL and BOND, in the bivariate models are consistent
with the respect to the lag lengths. These models have overall few lags. LDER deviates
from the market vet alues of capital structure measures. Bivariate cointegration cannot
be rejected for LDER with TS. The bivariate cointegration models LDER-TQ and LDER-
TS have …ve lags as to one to two lags for the other bivariate models were cointegration
is found.The …ndings are appealing as cointegration and lag lengths of the models can
be explained with the use of market-value-of-equity or the book-value-of-equity as a mea-
12The presence of autocorrelation in the residual vector is an indicator of model miss-speci…cation
(Enders (1995)).
7Table 3: Johansens test for cointegration: Bivariate models for Hufvudstaden
H0: r = 0
Models ¸max ¸trace
Panel A


















































Comments: Astrix values reject the null hypothesis. 90% critical values within brackets.
l indicates the number of lags in the VAR speci…cation.
8sure of capital structure ratio. The results provide support for hypothesis H1-H3 when
LDER is used as a measure of capital structure. Hypothesis H1 and H2 is supported
when DMER and LDMER are used. Thus, the support of hypothesis H1 and H2 is in this
context robust to the measure of capital structure. We now turn our attention towards
the multivariate models of cointegration.
4.3 Multivariate results
The multivariate cointegration results are reported in table 4. The presence of cointe-
gration is indi¤erent to the measure of capital structure used in this study.13 Thus this
supports hypothesis H4, the idea of a long run relationship between capital structure
and the cost of debt, agency costs and tax shield. The presence of multiple cointegra-
tion vectors is found for capital structure measures LDER and DMER where as a unique
cointegration relationship is established for LDMER. This further suggests the optimal
capital structure is multivariate in its nature.
The coe¢cients of the cointegration vectors are presented in table 5. Support is found
for both positive and negative relationships between capital structure measures and the
proxy variables. The variable TS in the second cointegration vector of LDER does seem
to be economically unrealistic. However, the economic signi…cance of the vector should
be interpreted with caution. If we discard this vector the following emerge: the proxy
variables BILL and TQ has positive sign independent of the optimal capital structure
measure. TQ has the highest beta value while the sign and the magnitude of TS vary the
most.
The loadings ®’s, in table 5 can be viewed as the average speed of adjustment to the
equilibrium subspace. High coe¢cients indicate rapid speed of adjustment. There is how-
ever, a large variation between the magnitudes of the di¤erent ®’s and the cointegration
vectors in table 5. Although, we …nd cointegration relationships irrespectively of which
measure of capital structure is employed, only one cointegration vector exhibits signi…cant
value for all the ®’s: the …rst cointegration vector of multivariate model with LDER. This
is appealing, as the highly signi…cant ®’s capture the short-run dynamics.
table 5 reports the long-run matrix for each of ratios of optimal capital structure. The
long-run matrix is the combined e¤ect of the ®’s and the ¯’s. These estimates further
support the hypothesis of a multivariate approach in capital structure theory.
13For all of the multivariate cointegration model the eigen-values of the companion matrix lie within
the unit circle. The data is not presented in this paper but they are available on request.
9Table 4: Johansens test for cointegration: Multivariate models for Hufvudstaden AB
Model H0: ¸max ¸trace




































Comments: Astrix values reject the null hypothesis. 90% critical values within brackets
l indicates the number of lags in the VAR speci…cation.
As we can see from table 5 the eigenvector values of BILL and BOND are generally
quite small as to the other eigenvalues and in the case of LDMER and DMER they seem to
be close to zero. Thus, as BILL and BOND do not seem to contribute to the cointegration,
a natural way to proceed is to test the restriction of ¯BILL and ¯BOND being zero. An
advantage with the Johansen and Juselius cointegration framework is that it enables us
to test restrictions on the parameter subspace. The test is an ordinary likelihood ratio
test based upon the log-likelihood of the restricted and unrestricted model. The result of
the test is showed in table 6.
If we measure capital structure as book-value-of-debt-to-market-value-of-equity we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the eigenvalues of BILL and BOND being zero. The
measure of book value of equity, LDER, presents us with a strong rejection of the hy-
pothesis. The latter is expected as the eigenvalues of BILL and BOND are close to one,
see table 5.
Finally, we have to be aware of that there seems to be a trade of between the number
of lags in the VAR-speci…cation and the signi…cance of the short-run dynamics. As the
number of lags increase so does the memory of the process. One could argue that a
shortcoming of this study is that it does not contribute to the answer of which are the
economically appropriate lag lengths. If we take the lag length in to consideration the
10Table 5: Eigenvalues, eigenvectors and weights of the multivariate models
LDER
LDER TQ TS BILL BOND
Eigenvector (¯) -1.00 1.49 0.92 1.01 -0.92
















DMER TQ TS BILL BOND
Eigenvector (¯) -1.00 1.38 3.33 0.03 0.06
















LDMER TQ TS BILL BOND








Comment: t-values within brackets.
Astrix values reject the null hypothesis of ® = 0 at 5% level.
Table 6: Test of the hypothesis: No long -run impact of BILL and BOND in the multivariate
models
H0: ¯BILL = ¯BOND = 0
Model Â2
p p-value
LDER (p = 2) 22.25¤ 0.00
DMER (p = 2) 1.92 0.38
LDMER (p = 1) 1.88 0.17
Comment: asterix values reject the null hypothesis at 5% signi…cance level. p=degrees of freedom
11results of the individual multivariate model are vague, but together the results of a long-
run equilibrium relationship indi¤erent to the measure of capital structure, supports the
hypothesis of the capital structure being determined by several factors. However, the
signi…cance of the short-term, BILL, and the long-term interest rate, BOND, does depend
on whether book- or market-value-of-equity is employed in the capital structure measure.
5 Conclusion
This study employs a new …rm speci…c approach to test in order to test existing capital
structure theories on a very long time series of newly constructed yearly data, 1938-1996.
The result of our …rm speci…c study supports the theories of a dynamic capital structure
path over time. Further we employ a new proxy variable for tax shield.
Evidence is presented of equilibrium relationships in both bivariate cointegration mod-
els as well as in multivariate cointegration models.
The …nding further supports the theory of a long-run relationship between the proxy
variables of corporate tax, agency costs, cost of capital, cost of long-term and total debt
and capital structure. This also suggests capital structure being more complex as to the
tested theories.
The number of cointegration vectors and the number of lags in the multivariate coin-
tegration models depend on whether or not market-value- or book-value-of-equity is used
as measure of leverage. The di¤erent measures of capital structure are found to exhibit
di¤erent properties. However, we cannot conclude which measure of capital structure that
should be preferred.
The use of long-term-debt-to-book-value-of-equity ratio in the multivariate model
presents us with signi…cant parameters for both the short- and the long run dynamics.
The results of this study are that capital structure, for this …rm, does follow a dynamic
equilibriumpath. Hence, we cannot rejectany of the theories suggestingan optimal capital
structure. The …ndings justify the use of the cointegration framework on capital structure
relationships and this ought to be applicable on other companies as well as industries.
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